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Many theoretical traditions have contributed to the scientific elucidation of emotion, but 
philosophers facing the question ‘what is an emotion?’ have concentrated on two of these 
in particular.1 Philosophical ‘cognitivism’ is inspired by the appraisal tradition in 
psychology (e.g. Arnold, 1960, 1970; Scherer, 1999). The alternative, ‘neo-Jamesian’ 
approach is inspired by the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ in affective neuroscience 
(Damasio, 1996; Panksepp, 1998). Cognitivists identify emotions with representations of 
the stimulus situation, or ‘evaluative judgments’ (Solomon, 1976, 1993). Neo-Jamesians 
identify emotions with states of bodily arousal, which are detected by the brain as affect 
(Prinz, 2004b). Both these views of emotion parallel the view of cognition which has 
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 For the breadth of current psychological research, see (Dalgleish & Power, 1999; Ekman & Davidson, 
1994; M  Lewis & Haviland-Jones, 2000). Recent philosophical work on emotion is surveyed in (Griffiths, 
2003) and collected in (Solomon, 2004). 
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been called into question by situated cognition research (Cantwell-Smith, 1999; Clark, 
1997).  In both theories, emotions are conceived as internal states or processes and the 
role of the environment is confined to providing stimuli and receiving actions. Thus, 
although Prinz advocates ‘Embodied emotions’ (Prinz, 2004a), his contribution does not 
emphasize the role of the environment, assimilating emoting to perceiving actual or “as 
if” changes of one’s own body (Damasio 1999). In a further parallel with traditional 
views of cognition, both cognitivists and neo-Jamesians focus on the contributions that 
emotions make to the organism’s internal, psychological economy. The primary function 
of emotions, on both accounts, is to provide the organism’s decision making systems with 
information about the significance of a stimulus situation.  
 
This chapter describes a very different perspective on emotion, according to which 
emotions are: 
 
1. Designed to function in a social context: an emotion is often an act of relationship 
reconfiguration brought about by delivering a social signal.   
2. Forms of skillful engagement with the world which need not be mediated by 
conceptual thought 
3. Scaffolded by the environment, both synchronically in the unfolding of a 
particular emotional performance and diachronically, in the acquisition of an 
emotional repertoire 
4. Dynamically coupled to an environment which both influences and is influenced 
by the unfolding of the emotion 
 
We draw heavily on ‘transactional’ accounts of emotion proposed by some contemporary 
psychologists (Fridlund, 1994; Parkinson, 1995; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; 
Russell & Fernández-Dols, 1997). Although these authors do not, to our knowledge, 
conceive their work as a contribution to the ‘situationist’ literature that is the focus of this 
volume, we contend that their proposals constitute a fairly exact, affective parallel to 
situationist ideas about cognition. The primary aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that a 
situated approach to emotion already exists and is backed by a substantial experimental 
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literature.  This body of theory and data could make a major contribution to fleshing out 
the general situationist perspective on the mind. 
We emphasize that adopting the situationist perspective does not require denying the 
results produced by other theoretical traditions in psychology, such as the ‘affect 
program’ tradition, or even the heuristic value of alternative theoretical perspectives. 
Instead, the situated perspective shifts our theoretical focus to neglected phenomena and 
questions. The situated approach to emotion is at its most compelling when applied to 
exemplars like anger in a marital quarrel or embarrassment whilst delivering a song to an 
audience. These are cases in which the emotion has a temporal course of development 
and involves an ongoing exchange of emotional signals (facial actions, tones of voice, 
etc). This switch in the focus of emotion theory parallels the way in which situated 
cognition research switches the focus of cognitive science from exemplars like theorem-
proving to engaged, real-time exemplars like navigation in a cluttered environment. 
Finally, the situated perspective on emotion has some points in common with ‘active 
vision’ accounts of situated perception (Noë, this volume). In traditional models of 
emotional appraisal, the organism receives information from the environment and uses it 
to determine the emotional significance of the situation that confronts it. In contrast, the 
situated perspective envisages organisms ‘probing’ their environment through initial 
emotional responses, and monitoring the responses of other organisms to determine how 
the emotion will evolve (see section 5).  
2. Social situatedness 
 
A situated perspective on the mind recognizes that it is designed to function in an 
environmental context and that aspects of the environment may be causal components of 
mental mechanisms (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Research on situated cognition has often 
emphasized the reliable physical properties of the environment, properties which can be 
exploited to reduce cognitive load. In contrast, a situated perspective on emotion 
emphasizes the role of social context in the production and management of an emotion, 
and the reciprocal influence of emotion on the evolving social context. Behaviors which 
have traditionally been viewed as involuntary expressions of the organism’s 
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psychological state are instead viewed as signals designed to influence the behavior of 
other organisms, or as strategic ‘moves’ in an ongoing transaction between organisms2.  
 
One of the most important experimental paradigms for a situated perspective on emotion 
is the study of ‘audience effects’ – differences in emotional response to a constant 
stimulus which reflect differences in the expected recipient(s) of the emotion. Amongst 
the most dramatic effects are those obtained for the production of the so-called 
‘Duchenne smile’ – the pattern of movement of mouth and eyes generally accepted as a 
pan-cultural expression of happiness (Ekman, 1972). Ten-pin bowlers are presumably 
happiest when they make a full strike, less happy when they knock down a few pins. 
However, bowlers rarely smile after making a full strike when facing away from their 
bowling companions and smile very often after knocking down a few pins when they face 
their companions (Kraut & Johnston, 1979). Spanish soccer fans show a similar pattern in 
their facial response to goals, and issue Duchenne smiles only when facing one another 
(Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1997). Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-Belda also demonstrate 
that at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, although Gold medalists produced many signs of 
emotion during the medal ceremony, they produced Duchenne smiles almost exclusively 
when interacting with the audience and officials.  
 
These results suggest that smiles are not outpourings of happiness which are merely 
witnessed by other people, but rather affiliative gestures made by one person to another 
with respect to something good which has occurred. This fits the model of emotions as 
strategic moves in the context of a social transaction. Obviously, people do smile and 
produce other classical emotional expressions when they are alone, but studies suggest 
that they do so far less often than one might expect. Even such apparently reflexive 
displays as facial expressions produced in response to tastes and smells appear to be 
facilitated by an appropriate social setting and the same appears to be the case for pain 
expressions (Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernández-Dols, 2003). Furthermore, it would be a 
                                                 
2
 The strategic role of the emotions has long been noticed by economists (Frank, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1987). 
Until recently, however, this recognition was not linked to a new account of the nature of emotions 
themselves (but see Ross & Dumouchel, 2004).  Not surprisingly, behavioral ecologists have also been 
sensitive to the strategic role of emotions in social interaction (e.g. Fessler & Haley, 2003). 
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mistake to conclude that audience effects are absent when a physical audience is absent. 
Solitary subjects who mentally picture taking part in a social interaction produce more 
emotional facial signals than subjects who focus on the emotional stimulus without an 
imagined audience. Fridlund has described this as ‘implicit sociality’ and remarked that 
his experimental subjects display to the ‘audience in their heads’ (Fridlund, 1994; 
Fridlund et al., 1990). 
 
The sensitivity to social context manifested in audience effects can be implemented by 
very simple mental mechanisms, as is evident from the prevalence of audience effects in 
animals.  This is important, because it helps to explain how the emotions can be produced 
‘strategically’ without becoming mere pretences of emotion (see also Griffiths, 1997, Ch 
6; 2004b). Male Golden Sebright Chickens, for example, make a fuss when they find and 
consume a valuable morsel of food, but only if there are female chickens in the vicinity 
(Marler & Evans, 1997). There is, presumably, no point in demonstrating foraging ability 
to other males!  Results like these suggest that the social situatedness of emotion is not a 
special human achievement mediated by conceptual thought, but a fundamental aspect of 
emotion (see section 3). 
 
Socially situated emotions have a ‘strategic’ aspect neglected in cognitivist and neo-
Jamesian accounts of emotion. Emotions have been seen as more or less accurate 
responses to how things are, but they are also, and perhaps primarily, more or less 
effective goal-oriented responses. For example, one study in which people were asked to 
describe situations in which they had become angry found that the prospect of obtaining 
compensation is a significant factor determining whether a loss elicits anger or sadness 
(Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). This is puzzling if anger is merely a response to 
having been wronged, but makes good sense if anger is a strategy to obtain restitution.  
 
Embarrassment is an emotion which wears its social situatedness on its face, as most 
theories of embarrassment acknowledge (Parkinson et al., 2005, 188-192). The finding 
that observers evaluate people who behave in socially inappropriate manner more highly 
if they show embarrassment suggests that one function of embarrassment may be to 
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indicate knowledge of a violated norm and acceptance of its validity (see section 3 for 
more on embarrassment elicitors). In a study in which subjects were asked to record a 
karaoke-style performance of a notoriously embarrassing love song, the singer’s 
subsequent level of embarrassment was reduced if they were given reason to believe that 
the experimenter knew they were embarrassed by their own performance (Leary, Landel, 
& Patton, 1996). The authors take this result to suggest that embarrassment functioned as 
a signal: the singer needed to convey to the audience that they had a low opinion of the 
song, thus confirming the singer’s knowledge of, and desire to conform to, community 
standards. 
 
Some emotional behavior simply cries out for a ‘transactional’ analysis. Sulking is 
normally thought of as a manifestation of emotion, but traditional theories of emotion do 
little to illuminate it. This is perhaps why there has been so little research on a 
phenomenon of such obvious importance to human relationship dynamics. Sulking 
sabotages mutually rewarding social transactions and rejects attempts at reconciliation. 
Traditional appraisal theory can identify sulking as a manifestation of anger, but does 
nothing to explain the specifics of sulking, which must be handed off to a separate theory 
of emotion management or emotion coping. It is also implausible that all (or even most) 
people who sulk sincerely judge themselves to have been wronged, so an ancillary theory 
of self-deceit is needed as well. In contrast, viewing an emotion as a strategy of 
relationship reconfiguration (Parkinson, 1995, 295) provides a compelling perspective of 
sulking. Sulking is a behavioral strategy for seeking a better deal in a relationship – an 
emotional game of ‘chicken’ in which transactions that benefit both parties are rejected 
until appropriate concessions are obtained. The question confronting an agent deciding 
whether to become upset in this way is not whether they have been slighted simpliciter, 
but whether taking what has happened as a slight and withdrawing cooperation will give 
them leverage. Once again, this strategic appraisal of the situation may be realized by a 
relatively simple mental mechanism. 
 
The situated perspective on emotion can be seen as an attempt to refocus discussion on a 
new set of examples. Rather than taking the meeting between a man and a bear in a 
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lonely wood as a paradigm of fear, attention is focused on displays of fear produced by a 
child when her caregiver is at hand. Rather than taking righteous anger at the injustices of 
the world to be the paradigm of anger, anger is studied in the context of its development 
in a marital confrontation. The aim of this refocusing is twofold:  first, to illuminate the 
aspects of emotional life that are arguably most relevant to practical issues of emotion 
management and, second, to reveal the social aspects of many other emotions that are 
overlooked when they are assimilated to the traditional exemplar cases. 
 
3.  Non-conceptual emotional content 
 
Most situationist literature opposes the idea that the primary medium of cognition is 
conceptual thought.  While not denying that conceptual thought exists, situationists see it 
as only the icing on the cognitive cake. Other forms of cognition explain most of the 
practical abilities of organisms to negotiate their environments (Cantwell-Smith, 1999; 
Cussins, 1992). In this section we explore a similar perspective on emotional content. 
 
To be credited with conceptual thought, a creature must fulfill requirements of ‘maximal 
inferential promiscuity’ with respect to its thought contents (Hurley, 2003). A popular 
way to state this requirement is Evans’ (1982) ‘generality constraint’, according to which 
a mental state qualifies as a “thought that ‘a is F’” just in case it is possible for the subject 
to decompose that state into re-combinable ingredients and form with such ingredients 
mental states of two sorts: states which predicate of “a” any property G the subject can 
conceive of, and states which predicate F of any object “b” the subject can conceive of. 
The ability to entertain the thought ‘a is F’ is therefore “a joint exercise of two abilities” 
(Evans, 1982, 104), namely the ability to have the concept of a particular object ‘a’ and 
the ability to have the concept of a particular property ‘F’. These abilities underlie the 
higher-order ability to think ‘productively’ and ‘systematically’ sensu Fodor (1975 and 
elsewhere). 
 
Situationists argue that skillful activities such as navigating an environment, or cooking a 
meal can be conducted without conceptual thought in this sense, and that these abilities 
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are at least as important a part of cognition as abilities that require conceptual thought 
(Cantwell-Smith, 1999). In a similar fashion, the situated perspective on emotion views 
emotions as forms of skillful engagement with the world and resists the view that they 
either are or essentially involve conceptual thought. The ability to emote is not to be 
explained in terms of linguaform propositional attitudes and their use in practical and 
theoretical inferences. Instead, the contentfulness of emotions emerges from the fact that 
they enable dexterous interactions with the environment. Importantly, when ascribing this 
form of emotional content to an organism we are entitled to use concepts not possessed 
by the organism having the emotion, a standard condition for labeling a form of mental 
content as non-conceptual (Bermudéz, 2003). 3 
 
Although there is no room here to elaborate on the specifics of non-conceptual emotional 
representation, what appears to be crucial is that it is an action-oriented form of 
representation (Griffiths, 2004b; Scarantino, 2005). Emotional content has a 
fundamentally pragmatic dimension, in the sense that the environment is represented in 
terms of what it affords to the emoter in the way of skillful engagement with it. To get a 
more vivid intuitive grip on this, imagine the world-as-perceived (ümwelt) of an antelope 
suddenly confronted by a lion. The dominant elements of the antelope’s ümwelt are 
“escape-affordances” (Scarantino, 2004), as all of its cognitive, perceptual and motoric 
abilities are recruited to discover and execute an action sequence which evades the 
predator. This representation of the world in goal-oriented terms is required by the 
urgency of the situation, which demands selectively transforming inputs into 
opportunities for life-saving output rather than generating a multi-purpose representation 
of the environment. 
 
A situationist, action-oriented approach to emotional content is diametrically opposed to 
classic cognitivist theories of emotions, which take emotions to be evaluative judgments, 
or combinations of beliefs and desires (Marks, 1982; Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 1993). 
                                                 
3
 The non-conceptual content literature has so far focused primarily on non-conceptual perceptual states, 
non-conceptual subdoxastic states and non-conceptual representational states of creatures without language 
(Bermudéz, 2003). We think emotional phenomena constitute a representational domain of their own, 
which embodies a yet-to-be-understood brand of non-conceptual content (Griffiths, 2004a, 2004b; 
Scarantino, 2005). 
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Although this approach may give an accurate account of some forms of sophisticated 
human emotionality, it falls short as a general theory of emotions. In particular, the 
assumption that conceptual thought is essential for emotion prevents us from making 
sense of emotions in infants and animals. This is not only wildly counterintuitive 
(monkeys are never really afraid), but deprives us of two of the most fruitful avenues for 
the study of emotions, namely comparative animal studies and the exploration of 
ontogenetic emotional development. It is also inconsistent with the phenomenon of 
‘affective primacy’ (Öhman, 1999) in which emotion systems display some of the 
properties of a Fodorian module (Fodor, 1983): they are fast, mandatory, cognitively 
impenetrable, and have limited central access. The case of phobias is exemplary in this 
respect, since a phobic can reconcile the conceptual thought that the object of their 
phobia is completely harmless with utter terror towards it. The traditional cognitivist 
must assimilate phobias either to inconsistent beliefs or to self-deceit. In the case of fear 
at least, there is good scientific reason to believe that phobias result neither from logical 
error, nor from self-deceit, but from the neural architecture of the emotion system. By 
means of ingenious lesion studies, LeDoux has demonstrated that fear can be elicited in a 
reflex-like fashion through a neural low road that projects along a subcortical pathway 
directly to the amygdala and bypasses the neo-cortex (LeDoux, 1993). Since full-blown 
conceptual thought is generally assumed to involve the neo-cortex, this appears to be 
strong evidence that such conceptual thought is not essential for fear4. 
  
The biggest hurdle for a situated perspective of emotions is constituted by the so-called 
‘higher cognitive emotions’ (see section 6 for skepticism about this label). Guilt, shame, 
resentment, envy, and embarrassment, for example, seem connected by their very 
definitions to a range of sophisticated conceptual abilities. This perspective is supported 
by the psychological literature on emotional appraisal. The influential account of Lazarus 
(1991) suggests that each emotions is caused by an appraisal whose content can be 
captured by a ‘core relational theme’. Guilt is caused by the appraisal that one has 
                                                 
4
 The view that emotions are evaluative judgments has been extensively criticized for these reasons. Its 
defenders have replied that ‘judgment’ need not involve full-blown conceptual thought (Nussbaum, 2001, 
2004). This risks collapsing ‘cognitivism’ into the uncontroversial view that emotions are in some sense or 
other directed onto the world (Scarantino, 2005). 
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transgressed a moral imperative, and shame by the appraisal that one has failed to live up 
to an ego ideal. These appear to be paradigmatically conceptual thoughts, which demand 
possession of concepts such as “moral imperative”, “self”, and “ideal”. Conventional 
appraisal theory thus seems to tie these emotions to conceptual thought. But not only 
would this imply that emotions like guilt, shame and even anger cannot conceivably 
occur in children and animals, it  would also be inconsistent with the apparent occurrence 
of emotions such as victim guilt (Parkinson et al., 2005, and see below) or shame 
generated by merely interacting with a higher-ranking member of the community (Fessler 
1999).5 Confronted by these and other difficulties, appraisal theorists have come to accept 
that even such apparently conceptually complex appraisals as Lazarus’s ‘core relational 
themes’ can be made: 1. Without the information evaluated being available to other 
cognitive processes, 2. Before perceptual processing of the stimulus has been completed, 
and 3. Using only simple, sensory cues to define the property that has to be identified. 
The resulting ‘multi-level appraisal’ theories (Teasdale, 1999) suggest that the same 
content can be possessed at different ‘levels of appraisal’, a view consistent with the idea 
that some levels of appraisal involve non-conceptual content. 
 
The situated perspective on emotions identifies emotions like guilt and shame in a way 
that leaves open the extent to which they involve conceptual thought. The question 
becomes whether the social transaction corresponding to the emotion can occur in the 
absence of the appropriate conceptual thoughts. Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead (2005) 
offer us reasons to think that this is indeed the case for many higher cognitive emotions. 
They report a study by Kroon (1988) in which only 28% of the experimental subjects 
reporting guilt experiences deemed themselves to be causally related to the event which 
provoked their guilt. Parkinson (1999) further supports the view that it is not necessary to 
engage in thoughts of moral transgression in order to feel guilty, by documenting 
instances of guilt generated by unwarranted accusations from relevant others. These 
forms of guilt can be explained from a transactionalist perspective if guilt is a form of 
skillful social engagement aimed at reconciliation. When someone we care about accuses 
                                                 
5
 Fessler (1999) reports that ‘malu’, the emotion most closely corresponding to western ‘shame’ in the 
culture he studied, was frequently manifested under these circumstances. 
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us, even unjustly, a need to repair the relationship emerges. Guilt is often a good strategy 
to meet this need, because it conveys a message of sympathetic suffering and the 
intention to avoid future involvement in harmful events affecting the accuser. 
 
The transactionalist perspective makes sense of many otherwise mysterious forms of 
‘higher cognitive’ emotion. For example, although embarrassment has usually been 
associated with the recognition of personal failure with respect to relatively unimportant 
norms of conduct, embarrassment can be elicited simply by being pointed at in public (M 
Lewis, 2000), or being deservedly praised in public (Parrott & Smith, 1991). Parkinson, 
Fischer and Manstead interpret this as evidence that embarrassment can be a simple 
response to public attention, which does not presuppose negative self-evaluation. 
Embarrassment can thus occur as a result of mere unwanted attention, which may or may 
not be the result of having committed a faux-pas. From this perspective, embarrassment 
may be available to pre-linguistic children. Reddy (2000) reports the combination of coy 
smiles and gaze aversion in two-month old infants, which suggests the possibility that 
primitive forms of embarrassment may emerge much earlier than the cognitive capacities 
generally assumed to underlie them: “the dynamics of interpersonal interaction may 
produce emotion without the internal cognitive representation of those dynamics.  All 
that is required is a basic perception of self in relation to others, which may well be 
present at a very early age” (Parkinson et al., 2005, 210). This idea will be enlarged upon 
in the next section. 
4. Cultural scaffolding  
The concept of ‘environmental scaffolding’ has been central to situated cognition 
research: intelligent behavior is guided and supported by the context in which it unfolds. 
The emphasis here is on the active contribution of the environment to the cognitive 
process (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). To disregard the enabling properties of the 
environment is to lose sight of the fact that the causal structure underlying a great many 
cognitive achievements projects into the relational space between cognizer and 
environment. 
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A situated perspective on emotion recognizes that the environment plays an active role in 
structuring and enabling emotional ‘engagements’, which like cognitive ‘engagements’ 
are scaffolded by their natural context of occurrence.6 The environment scaffolds emotion 
in two ways. Synchronically, the environment supports particular emotional 
performances - particular episodes of, say, anger or sadness (see section 5).  
Diachronically, the environment supports the development of an ‘emotional phenotype’ 
or repertoire of emotional abilities. Thus, the provision of confessionals in churches 
enables certain kinds of emotional performance (synchronic scaffolding), and the broader 
Catholic culture supports the development of the ability to engage in the emotional 
engagements of confession (diachronic scaffolding). Synchronic scaffolding has received 
more attention than diachronic scaffolding in the literature on situated cognition (but see 
Thelen & Smith, 1994). In contrast, there is more research on the diachronic, 
developmental role of ‘affective culture’ than on its synchronic role. This is a byproduct 
of the longstanding ‘nature versus nurture’ debate in emotion theory.  
To appreciate the potential interest of the extensive body of research on emotional 
development, we need to defuse the heated but ultimately sterile debate over nature and 
nurture. Situated perspectives on emotion have traditionally been aligned with ‘social 
constructionism’ because of the simplistic view that evolved features of the mind must 
develop in ways that are insensitive to the social environment – they are ‘programmed in 
the genes’ (e.g. Ratner, 1989). Fortunately, it is increasingly recognized that evolution 
does not construct genetic homunculi, but rather developmental systems designed to 
function in a developmental context which, in a species like ours, includes socialization 
and exposure to all those factors that make up a culture (Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 
1992). Hence a feature of the emotional phenotype may be both a (phylogenetic) product 
of evolution and an (ontogenetic) product of a rich context of socialization. A fully 
adequate resolution of the nature/nurture debate, however, requires the additional 
recognition that the role of the developmental context is not restricted to activating 
alternative outcomes prefigured in a ‘disjunctive genetic program’ (Griffiths, 1997; 
                                                 
6
 The term “engagement” has been previously used to characterize emotions, for example by Parkinson 
(Forthcoming) and by Solomon (2004).  This similarity may be explained by the presence in Solomon’s 
cognitivism of a social constructionist strand, related to Sartre’s theory of emotions, which emphasizes the 
active side of emotions along broadly transactionalist lines.   
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Griffiths & Stotz, 2000). Developmental systems are usually competent to produce viable 
phenotypes outside the specific parameter ranges in which they have historically 
operated. This may even be an important source of evolutionary novelty (Schlichting & 
Pigliucci, 1998; West-Eberhard, 2003).  
In our view, an adequate perspective on the relationship between evolution and ‘social 
construction’ must recognize 1) that the way developing humans respond to inputs from 
the social environment and the fact that the social environments provide those inputs may 
both be subject to evolutionary explanation, and 2) that the biological endowment of a 
healthy human infant determines a norm of reaction which includes a large range of 
emotional phenotypes, not all of which have been specifically selected for, and not all of 
which need to have occurred before in human history (for similar perspectives, see 
Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002; Parkinson, Forthcoming). This said, we hope that we can 
go on to discuss the role of the environment in the genesis of emotions without being 
accused of ignoring biology. 
Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead (2005, 224) formulate a useful framework for the study 
of the environment’s many roles. They discuss both how the development of an 
emotional repertoire is diachronically scaffolded by the cultural context in which an 
individual grows up, and how specific emotional performances are synchronically 
scaffolded by the social and cultural context in which they occur. They discuss the 
potential social influences on emotion under the two broad headings of ideational factors 
and material factors, offering an adaptation of Markus and Kitayama’s (1994) model. 
Ideational factors include normative standards about when emotions should be 
experienced or expressed (e.g. American wedding guests are normatively required both to 
be happy for the couple and convey their happiness), emotion scripts (shared internalized 
understandings of the standard unfolding of an emotional episode), and ethnotheories 
(culture-specific belief systems about the nature and value of emotions). Material factors 
include emotional capital (the emotional resources associated with having a specific 
social status, gender, etc.), venues in which certain emotional performances are favored (a 
confessional, a stadium, a temple, etc.), and a range of emotional technologies for the 
management of emotions, from prayer beads to ProzacTM.  
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Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead draw on existing work on emotional development to 
construct a model of the development of a culturally situated emotional phenotype (2005, 
235-248). They distinguish three main ontogenetic stages: primary intersubjectivity, 
secondary intersubjectivity and cultural articulation. 
Primary intersubjectivity emerges in the first few months of a child’s life, when patterns 
of attraction and aversion are established with objects and relevant others, most 
prominently caregivers. One form of emotional engagement emerging at this stage 
involves struggling in response to a tight embrace (Camras, Campos, Oster, Miyake, & 
Bradshaw, 1992). Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead identify this as the ontogenetically 
earliest form of anger, despite the fact that the concepts which make up the ‘core 
relational theme’ of anger are not available at this point. This identification is made 
possible by thinking of anger as a type of social transaction, rather than as a conceptual 
thought embodying a core relational theme (see section 3). The primary anger reaction in 
infants is developmentally continuous with episodes of adult anger in which the core 
relational theme is not instantiated, such as anger elicited by repeated failure to open a 
jammed door.  
When the child is about one year old, Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead envisage the 
emergence of secondary intersubjectivity, characterized by the recognition not only of 
people and objects, but of the relations existing between them. A classic example of 
emotional engagement emerging at this stage is social referencing. Infants learn to 
engage objects emotionally in light of the emotional responses other people have to them. 
For example, if toddlers observe a disgust expression on their mother’s face when they 
are handling a toy, they are less inclined to play with it (Hornik, Risenhoover, & Gunnar, 
1987) 
Finally, infants ‘articulate’ their emotions with the help of their emerging conceptual 
resources (cultural articulation). Drawing on symbolic resources in the surrounding 
culture, most importantly those afforded by language, the child organizes its experience 
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of emotional transactions in conceptual form7. It is at this stage that ideational factors 
such as emotions scripts and display rules, and material factors such as emotional capital 
and emotional technologies have their greatest impact on emotional development.  
It is in their understanding of cultural articulation that Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 
depart from traditional social constructionism. Articulation does not simply cause 
emotions to take on the form suggested by the local affective culture. Whilst the 
articulated, concept-mediated emotion is a real component of the emotion system, it is 
superimposed on an existing emotional repertoire grounded in primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity: “We don’t learn to get angry in the first place by following cultural 
rules, even if those rules are applied to our anger after the fact.” (Parkinson et al., 2005, 
247). The conceptual articulation of the emotion allows for the emergence of tensions 
between emotional engagements reflecting different ontogenetic stages (e.g. some 
episodes of anger may not fit normative rules for their appropriate elicitation, as in the 
case of the jammed door). In such cases the subject will often struggle to interpret a 
spontaneous emotional response so as to fit the cultural articulation of an appropriate 
emotion. 
Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead’s account of the ontogeny of emotion allows 
individuals raised in different affective cultures to develop different emotional 
phenotypes. This could happen in either of two ways. First, individuals do conform to a 
significant degree with the norms and scripts that they have internalized. Second, all sorts 
of cultural differences - physical childcare practices, common toys, and so forth - may 
affect emotional development. It is worth noting, however, that these latter influences 
need not necessarily increase the ‘fit’ between emotion as experienced and emotion as 
articulated. It is perfectly conceivable that some element of the upbringing of children in 
an affective culture might make it harder for them to conform to its norms as adults than 
would otherwise be the case. In any case, even when cultural articulation has had its full 
effect on the development of the emotional repertoire, a gap remains which allows 
emotions to occur in the absence of the conceptual conditions taken to define them. 
                                                 
7
 There is an evident parallel here with the Annette Karmiloff-Smith’s theory of ‘representational 
redescription’ (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) 
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We now turn from the cultural scaffolding of emotional development (diachronic 
scaffolding) to the cultural scaffolding of emotional performances (synchronic 
scaffolding). For society to function smoothly, individuals must have the right emotions 
at the right times, and it is not left to individual psychological processes to ensure that 
this occurs. It is hardly necessary to describe the ‘emotional technologies’ used to ensure 
that soldiers hate the enemy, feel loyalty to their unit and are not overwhelmed by fear in 
combat.  Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead use the more cheerful example of the wedding 
ceremony, in which ritual, music and setting scaffold participants’ performances of their 
complementary affective roles. It is not left to chance to make a wedding a ‘big day’ for 
all concerned. Such ‘real-time’ socialization is an alternative to inducing conformity with 
local affective norms via diachronic socialization (Parkinson et al., 2005, 226). 
Another ‘real time’ process inducing conformity to emotional norms is ‘social appraisal’, 
in which an individual’s appraisal of a situation is linked to that of others. The most 
famous experiment on social appraisal (more precisely, ‘social referencing’) 
demonstrated that the willingness of infants to crawl over a ‘visual cliff’ reflected 
whether their waiting mother produced a positive or negative facial expression (Sorce, 
Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). Similar processes occur in adults. A tactless remark 
can be shrugged off when the other members of a social gathering treat it as a non-event, 
or when they laugh it off, whereas it may be appraised as a deadly insult if by-standers 
meet it with silence or with a sharp intake of breath. Such ‘distributed’ appraisal provides 
an emotional correlate to ‘distributed cognition’ (e.g. Hutchins, 1995). 
‘Real time socialization’ is perhaps the closest parallel in emotion research to the forms 
of scaffolding that have been the focus of much philosophical discussion of situationism, 
such as the notorious notebook of Clark and Chalmers (1998). In our view, too much 
attention has been devoted to whether such ‘cognitive aids’ imply that cognition is 
literally spread out into the world. Similar claims have been made in the literature on the 
emotions, with emotions said to exist in the social space between transactants, and so 
forth, but we believe it would be a mistake to focus on these questions, which are largely 
semantic. The real interest of situationist accounts of emotion lies in their methodological 
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prescriptions for future psychological study of the emotions. We will return to this theme 
in Section 6. 
5. Dynamic coupling 
 
A situated perspective on cognition includes the realization that cognition is dynamically 
shaped by the context in which a cognitive episode takes place. This context changes 
over time, sometimes as a consequence of the cognitive activity. Context-dependence 
generates a system of reciprocal causation which classic approaches to the mind tend to 
neglect, as they abstract from the local properties of the environment (Cantwell-Smith, 
1999). A situated perspective on emotion explores some of the same themes, focusing on 
the temporal dynamics of skillful emotional engagement, exploring the way in which the 
emotional episode shapes the context of its development and is in turn shaped by it. Since 
the context of emotional episodes is largely social, understanding the dynamic coupling 
between emoter and environment amounts to understanding how the unfolding of an 
emotion episode affects the behaviors of other organisms and is in turn shaped by their 
behavior. Emotion is a form of skillful engagement with the social environment that 
involves a dynamic process of negotiation mediated by reciprocal feedback between 
emoter and interactants. This feedback is provided by reciprocal emotional signals.  
 
Researchers on situated cognition have been strongly influenced by the ‘dynamical’ 
cognitive science approach featured in the collection Mind as Motion (Port & van Gelder, 
1995). The ‘dynamicist’ ideas presented here have a rather different pedigree, as they are 
primarily grounded in the study of ‘relationship dynamics’ (Hinde, 1979, 1981). This 
large body of work on topics such as infant attachment and romantic relationships starts 
from the premise that relationships are not an immediate function of the properties that 
individuals bring to a relationship, but emerge as a result of specific interactions between 
those individuals and inputs from a changing environment. 
 
The ethologist Robert Hinde (Hinde, 1985a, 1985b) was the first to articulate the idea that 
emotional behavior can be a form of negotiation. He noticed that several kinds of 
emotional expressions, in both humans and animals, are issued only when a recipient is 
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there to be influenced by them, and that it is the responses of the recipient which 
determine the subsequent behavior of the individual exhibiting the initial emotional 
behavior, rather than the presumed emotion ‘expressed’ by that behavior. Hinde noted 
that birds often flee after having issued a threat expression. Indeed, the threat display may 
be a better predictor of flight than of attack. His interpretation was that threat displays 
“were given when the bird was uncertain what to do” and that “which of the several 
possible responses it showed next depended on the behavior of the rival”. Hence threat 
expressions should be understood as “signals in a process of negotiation between 
individuals” (Hinde, 1985a, 109). 
 
Hinde cast doubt on the assumption that “emotional behavior is the outward expression 
of an emotional state, and that there is a one-to-one correspondence between them”, an 
assumption he associated with Darwin (1872). He also noted that the assumption of a 
one-to-one correspondence between emotional states and emotional behaviors does not 
make evolutionary sense, as it may be adaptive for an organism to mislead others about 
their motivational state. Natural selection will often favor sending non-veridical or 
ambiguous messages, a point which has also impressed transactional psychologists 
(Fridlund, 1994, 1997). Hinde acknowledged, however, that signals do not always serve 
negotiating purposes. His conclusion was that we should expect emotional behaviors to 
lie on a continuum between expressing and negotiating:  
 
Such considerations suggest the view that emotional behavior may lie along a 
continuum from behaviour that is more or less purely expressive to behaviours 
concerned primarily with a process of negotiation between individuals…In 
animals, bird songs lies nearer the expressive end, threat postures nearer the 
negotiation end. In man, spontaneous and solitary laughter are primarily 
expressive, the ingratiating smile primarily negotiating. However most emotional 
expressions involve both (Hinde, 1985b, 989) 
 
We consider this to be an important insight. Hinde’s suggestion is that many emotional 
expressions have a non-arbitrary relation to the organism’s motivational states, but at the 
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same time are aimed at making a move in a negotiation whose outcome is open-ended 
and crucially dependent upon the recipient’s responses.   
 
The first thing that is left open by an expressive action is whether the emoter will 
manifest the action tendency associated with that emotion. This will depend on what 
affordances are available to the emoter in the local context in which the emotional 
episode unfolds. Notably, neither the available affordances nor the emoter’s intention to 
act upon a particular one of them are pre-ordained at the beginning of the episode, but 
instead are partially determined by the interactant’s responses, which are in turn 
influenced by the ongoing emotional signals received. Consider, for example, an episode 
of anger in the context of a marital confrontation, and assume that an action tendency of 
retribution is associated with anger. There are many ways in which the retributive action 
tendency could be manifested: sulking, insulting, leaving the house, asking for a divorce, 
and so on. Conversely, the retributive tendency could be inhibited. Anger can be diffused 
by emotion management techniques, or redirected at another object (e.g. the poverty that 
is the external driver of marital discord), or the aroused state of either party could 
facilitate the emergence of another emotion (e.g. fear of losing one’s partner). This 
flexibility is one of the trademark properties of a large class of emotions, which 
distinguishes them from ‘reflex like’ responses like startle, and perhaps affect programs, 
whose behavioral consequences are relatively indefeasible. 
 
What determines how a particular episode of anger unfolds is a feedback mechanism 
which involves the reciprocal exchange of signals delivered by expressions and other 
behavior in the course of time. The currency of this communication includes fixed stares, 
loud and high pitched tones, brisk gestures, a confrontational demeanor, tears, firm 
declarations, forceful movements, and their strategic opposites (amicable stares, low 
pitched tones, smiles, etc.) which will determine if and how anger will be manifested.  
This is where the metaphor of negotiation comes to full fruition, as the anger episode is 
not exhausted by the interactant’s reception of a one-shot message, but is dynamically 
shaped by how the interactant responds to the initial message, by how the emoter 
responds to the interactant’s response, and so on. This context-dependence is entirely lost 
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if anger is understood only as a response to a certain class of stimulus situations, ignoring 
the temporal dynamics of its unfolding and the strategy of relationship reconfiguration it 
embodies.  
 
An emotional expression may also be open-ended in a more radical way: in some cases 
the identity of the initial emotion is shaped by the ongoing process of negotiation. We are 
accustomed to think of anger as brought about by the appraisal of being slighted, and this 
is certainly what happens in many cases of anger. But on occasion this appraisal is best 
understood as the outcome of negotiation in an episode which already has the marks of 
the emotional (e.g. physiological arousal, focused attention, an urgent tendency to realign 
one’s role in the context of a relationship). What is left partially undetermined and in 
need of context-dependent disambiguation is what emotion exactly one is experiencing. 
Many marital quarrels begin from small matters of contention, which engage the partners 
emotionally, but where that general ‘emotionality’ can develop into a variety of distinct 
emotions. This idea of ‘emotional uncertainty’ echoes some of the dynamics of threat 
displays described by Hinde (1985a; 1985b). The bird’s confrontation with a rival 
activates an emotional engagement which is open-ended in the sense that at the beginning 
of the process of negotiation it is undetermined whether the bird is angry or afraid. The 
identity of the emotion will be shaped through time by the responses received to the 
threat display. The appraisal which type-identifies the emotion does not occur at the 
beginning of the emotional episode but in the course of it, depending on whether or not 
the interaction affords the advantageous manifestation of one emotion rather than the 
other. 
 
At first blush, a situated perspective on emotions is in tension with the ‘affect program’ 
conception of emotions in the Darwin-Tomkins-Ekman tradition (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 
1972; Tomkins, 1962). In this theoretical tradition, a low-level (modular) appraisal occurs 
upon exposure to certain stimuli and is followed by a cascade of responses, including 
physiological, expressive and behavioral ones, which follow the appraisal quickly and 
automatically. A specific expression is associated with each basic emotion, and 
consequently carries veridical and highly reliable information about what emotion is 
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unfolding. The apparent conflict between affect program theory and a situated approach, 
however, can be at least partly defused by noticing that the two approaches operate on a 
different temporal scale. The situated approach focuses on longer emotional episodes 
which may comprise the activation of affect programs as proper parts. For example, a 
young man who is suddenly poked in the back while standing in a queue will 
automatically undergo affect program anger, manifested in a reflex-like fashion through 
forceful turning around, baring of the teeth and an aggressive action tendency. But there 
is no obstacle to conceiving of this execution of the anger affect program as part of a 
longer episode, which includes what happens after the identity of the offender has been 
determined. It is at this stage that the idea of negotiation acquires explanatory purchase. If 
the offender is a good-looking young woman who profusely apologizes, the agonistic 
action tendency is likely to be promptly substituted by an affiliative action tendency. If 
the offender is another young male, however, a different dynamic emerges, which may 
lead to an exchange of anger displays and ultimately escalate into a physical fight.  
 
Moreover, a situated approach is not committed to the view that all things we call 
emotions in ordinary language are social engagements with a negotiating dimension. 
What we have described are emotions lying towards the negotiating end of the continuum 
discussed by Hinde, and the vernacular emotion domain contains states and processes on 
which a situated approach sheds no light, as we discuss below. 
 
6. What is the value of the situated perspective on emotion? 
In this final section, we illustrate what we take to be the theoretical payoff of a situated 
perspective, and try to diffuse some possible misunderstandings. Let us begin with what 
we are not saying. We are not claiming that, because the social environment provides 
dynamic scaffolding for the unfolding of emotional episodes, an emotion literally extends 
into the environment. This sort of ontological claim may be interesting in principle, but 
we do not think that its possible heuristic value for the psychology of emotion is likely to 
be worth the fuss it causes. An ‘extended emotion’ thesis potentially confuses the claim 
that the environment makes a causal contribution to a mental process with the more 
ontologically demanding claim that it is a constituent part of it (see Adams and Aizawa, 
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this volume). Therefore, until it proves impossible to phrase the substance of the situated 
perspective in any other way, we will remain neutral on the ‘extended emotion’ thesis.  
 
There are other potentially interesting questions we wish to remain neutral about, because 
we do not think the value of the situated perspective on emotions hinges on how we 
answer them. For example, it may be debated what sort of externalism about emotions is 
supported by the data and theory we have presented, or whether group emotions arising 
through mutual social referencing challenge methodological individualism in the 
psychology of emotion. We leave it to others to take definitive positions on these issues. 
 
It may forestall another misunderstanding if we state explicitly that the plausibility of the 
perspective we propose is not hostage to the success of the wider, situationist program. 
The situated perspective on emotion is supported, in so far as it is currently supported, by 
experimental data and theoretical considerations about the emotions.  
 
The real theoretical payoff of the situated perspective on emotions is methodological. By 
shifting theoretical focus from the intrapsychic to the interpersonal, from the unbidden to 
the strategic, from the short-lived to the long-lived, from the context-independent to the 
context-dependent, from the static to the dynamic, the situated perspective points the 
attention of the research community to aspects of emotions which have been unduly 
neglected and which may hold the key to understanding the nature and function of a large 
class of emotions. These aspects of emotion have not been entirely ignored, of course 
(e.g. Frijda, 1986 and elsewhere; Solomon, 1998), but we think they would have become 
more central if a broader perspective on the mind suitable to encourage them had been 
available. We believe that the situated approach can offer such perspective: the aspects of 
emotion we have highlighted as worthy of theoretical exploration largely correspond to 
those the situationist movement has singled out as neglected in classical cognitive 
science.  
We emphasize once again that the situationist perspective is not in principle incompatible 
with other existing theoretical approaches (e.g. neo-Jamesianism, affect program theory). 
In part this is a matter of temporal scale of resolution, as outlined in section 5. More 
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importantly, we believe, and have argued extensively in earlier work, that the plurality of 
states and processes that form the domain of emotion leave emotion theorists with no 
viable alternative to theoretical pluralism. Griffiths (1997; 2004a) has argued that it is 
unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular 
category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific 
psychology of the emotions. The psychological, neuroscientific and biological theories 
that best explain any particular subset of emotions will not adequately explain all 
emotions. In a slogan, emotion is not a ‘natural kind’. Scarantino (2005) has argued that 
the scientific project of answering questions of the form ‘What is an emotion?’ or ‘What 
is anger?’ is best understood as a project of explication. Explication involves offering a 
theoretically motivated precisification of an existing concept. Explications are not good 
or bad simpliciter, but relative to the theoretical objectives which motivate them. Where 
there is more than one sensible theoretical objective, quarreling about which explication 
should replace the original concept is simply not to have understood the ground rules of 
the activity of explicating. 
 
We have suggested that the situated perspective on emotions affords new theoretical 
leads for the explication of the so-called higher cognitive emotions (e.g. guilt, shame, 
embarrassment). Although these are the emotions involved in phenomena we are most 
eager to understand (e.g. morality, art, mental disorders, daily emotional management), 
they are also amongst the most complex and challenging of emotional states. Although 
one of us made extensive use of the phrase ‘higher cognitive emotions’ in earlier work 
(Griffiths, 1997), we now regard it as potentially confusing (Griffiths, 2004a). First, it 
suggests that the occurrence of these emotions necessarily involves conceptual thought, a 
view we have strongly questioned. Second, it seems almost irresistible to align the 
distinction between ‘basic emotions’ and ‘higher cognitive emotions’ with a distinction 
between two sets of vernacular emotion categories, anger, disgust, surprise being 
paradigmatically ‘basic’ and guilt, shame and embarrassment being paradigmatically 
‘higher’. We believe, however, that there is as much need for pluralism in the theoretical 
treatment of subordinate categories of emotion as there is in the treatment of the 
superordinate category of emotion: some instances of anger, disgust or surprise may be 
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adequately accounted for in the affect program framework, but others may require other 
theoretical perspectives, and the same holds for episodes of guilt, shame, or 
embarrassment. The situated perspective on emotion, and the transactional psychology on 
which we have drawn in describing it, is just one of these theoretical approaches, and it is 
meant to cut across the dichotomy between basic and higher cognitive emotions as 
generally understood. 
 
In a nutshell, the situated perspective suggests that certain forms of emotions cannot be 
understood without expanding our field of view. By confining our attention to neural 
circuitry alone, or to conceptual thought alone, we risk focusing on the proverbial tail of 
the emotional elephant. Its trunk and body may lie further afield, in the social and cultural 
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